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Abstract 
The purpose of the thesis is to reconsider the Norwegian non-membership of the EU and the 
Swedish non-membership of NATO. The premise of this extensive in-depth study is to 
contribute to our understanding of how state sovereignty can be pursued either individually 
or collectively. Empirically, I compare the strategies to approach these organizations as non-
members, and moreover what the implications are for these strategy choices. The theoretical 
definition of plan A is that a country applies for membership in the international 
organizations. Norway’s plan A was to join the EU but since the Norwegian elite lost the 
1994 referendum, the EEA agreement became plan B. I furthermore argue that Sweden 
never had a plan A of joining NATO and brought about plan B directly, which was the 
NATO Partnership. The political leadership has, through suboptimization, negotiated this 
plan B since the membership strategy is not possible. The thesis builds on the theoretical 
perspectives of Multi-Level Governance and bounded rationality, since rational decisions of 
maximizing are difficult where there are multiple sets of preferences, actors, and levels of 
governance. The main assumption is that sovereignty is maintained by collective action 
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1 Introduction: Nation-states and international organizations 
Governance is predicated on the capacity of a society to make decisions and pursue 
collective goals (Peters and Pierre 2009: 91). The chief structure in society for that pursuit is 
the sovereign state. Sovereignty implies that a state has the authority to govern itself and the 
concept is important when explaining the origins of the nation-state. The concept of 
sovereignty was previously formulated in Western Europe in the sixteenth century, at a time 
when state structures were weak. The states had small and ineffective bureaucracies, armed 
forces they could not control, and they had to deal with all kinds of strong local authorities 
and overlapping jurisdictions. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 established a minimally 
institutionalized interstate system that had taken over a century to accomplish (Wallerstein 
1999: 22-23). The Westphalian system was based on an agreement to respect the principle of 
territorial integrity. The typical sovereign state, as theorized since the seventeenth century, 
was endowed with strong boundaries (Piattoni 2010: 27).  
The modern state is a peculiar creation, since the states are so-called sovereign states within 
an interstate system (Wallerstein 1999: 22). The structure of the sovereign state has persisted 
over a long period of time. How far the states can proceed without fully giving up their 
sovereignty has always been a matter of consideration. The European Union (EU) and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came about as products of the World War II 
and these organizations are thus new kinds of cooperation. The accession processes have had 
their challenges based on states’ reservations about losing sovereignty and some states even 
remain outside these organizations. Norway is not a formal member of the EU and Sweden 
is not a formal member of NATO. 
The Nordic countries have a history of shared resistance toward organizations of 
supranational character. Regional integration among European community members and the 
end of the Cold War led Nordic governments to pursue a strategy of integration instead of 
autonomy. Integration occurs when the elite perceives that certain economic or security 
issues cannot be solved by national means alone and they consequently agree to joint 
policymaking in supranational institutions (Ingebritsen 1998: 5, 6, 10). The idea, today, 
among states is that important goals are achieved through cooperation rather than pursuing 
autonomy. There is internationalization through Multi-Level Governance (MLG) since 
issues, such as economic development and national security, are solved collectively by 
transferring some sovereignty from national level to supranational level. In the cases of 
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Norway and Sweden, sovereignty is maintained by collective action either through full 
membership or “half membership”.  
Both costs and benefits with the memberships of the EU and NATO and the public opinion 
are matters of consideration for the Norwegian and Swedish leaderships. “To join or not to 
join” is thus a matter of an elite-mass evaluation. Consequently, this evaluation has 
developed into cooperation as non-members and the Norwegian and Swedish elites are still 
considering how far they can get into the cooperation without crossing the line between non-
membership and membership. The countries cannot join the respective organization since 
public opinion does not give legitimacy to a membership strategy. To stand alone as a self-
determining state would be an alternative to an EU membership and a NATO membership. 
However, that will not happen. Therefore, they have to find other strategies for approaching 
the respective organization when they do not have such legitimacy and when there is a 
practical and economic need for political cooperation. 
The European Economic Area (EEA) agreement was signed and ratified by the Norwegian 
Parliament (Storting) in 1992, and it entered into force in 1994. The EEA was established as 
a response to the wish from the EFTA countries to access the single market, and Norway’s 
relation to the EU is thus mainly organized through the EEA agreement (Sverdrup 2004: 3). 
Sweden’s relationship with NATO is based on a longstanding national consensus on the 
policy of military nonalignment. Sweden joined the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 
1994 and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997 (NATO 2016). Sweden’s relation to 
NATO is mainly organized through the partnership agreement and partly through bilateral 
agreement with NATO countries. There is a nation-state paradigm since the countries aim 
for self-determination at the same time as they are dependent on political cooperation 
through organizations of supranational institutions.   
In the language of institutional theory, the formative moment for Norway was in the 1980s 
when Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland pushed for membership and association with 
the EU. Plan A was then that Norway would formally join the EU. However, since the elite 
lost the referendum of 1994 plan B was to continue with the establishment of the EEA 
agreement. This is an example of a strategy which I will refer to as suboptimization. 
Similarly, the formative moment for Sweden was in the 1990s when Sweden joined the 
NATO PfP. I argue that the elite did never carry through plan A, to formally join NATO, 
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and that it seized on plan B directly with the NATO Partnership and bilateral agreements. 
The suboptimization leaves them halfway inside the organization.   
1.1 Why are the cases of Norway and Sweden interesting to study?  
The issue regarding Norwegian EU membership has been one of the largest controversies in 
Norwegian politics in the postwar period and the EC/EU referendums of 1972 and 1994 
mobilized the voters in a very different way. The matter has consisted of an underlying 
tension in Norwegian politics, capable of splitting governments and parties before, during, 
and after the two referendums (NOU 2012: 269). Similarly, the issue regarding NATO has 
had the capacity to trigger severe attacks of political struggle in Swedish politics and few 
matters have been that surrounded by taboos as the relationship to NATO (Dahl 1999: 7).  
The thesis is relevant since it compares two rather unique countries considering their “half-
membership” in the organization they cannot formally join. It takes departure in a 
theoretically interesting puzzle of how to understand the elite’s decision-making in order to 
pursue state sovereignty. From a societal point of view, it is important to understand what 
explains this strategy choice and what the implications are for the society. Other small states 
have joined both the EU and NATO despite reservation toward supranational institutions. 
Norway and Sweden are therefore special cases since there has either been an attempt of 
joining the EU but with outcomes that do not allow for a membership, or to not even 
consider a NATO membership as an option. On the other hand, Norway chose to become a 
NATO member but not of the EU and Sweden chose to become an EU member but not of 
NATO. Through these specific memberships, the states have realized that sovereignty can be 
maintained under collective action. How come that the states have not joined the other 
organization as well? 
It is furthermore interesting why the Norwegian and Swedish elite is working toward a 
closer cooperation with the EU and NATO while membership is not on the political agenda 
and at the same time as the knowledge in society of the implications of the complex 
relationship is low. The cooperation can be seen as ambiguous, in both cases, since the 
policy adaptation has occurred at an elite level while there has been a broad resistance 
toward the respective organization at a public level.  
Both the EU and NATO have successively become more relevant for the states, both for 
economic and practical reasons, although this relevance has been fluctuating slightly at 
times due to various world events. Joining these international organizations formally comes 
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with choices that are irreversible, because once the country is in, it will be difficult to leave. 
Norway has chosen an agreement that in theory should be easier to resign. The same applies 
to Sweden’s relationship with NATO. So the strategy implementation requires an analysis 
where joining the organization has a long-term benefit and not only when the state considers 
that a membership can solve some issues for a shorter period of time. From this point of 
view, it is important to study how Norway and Sweden act under such circumstances as 
small states. It is therefore interesting to study them parallelly to find similarities and 
differences in the way the approach this situation of “join or not to join”.  
The elite’s decision-making, the public opinion, and the structure of the Norwegian and 
Swedish societies have defined the path for the countries and their approaches toward the 
respective organization. The decision-making can be seen through the lenses of bounded 
rationality since the solution is not fully optimal from an overall perspective.  
1.2 Purpose of the study and research questions 
The aim of this extensive in-depth study is to contribute to our understanding of how state 
sovereignty can be pursued either individually or collectively. Empirically, I compare the 
Norwegian non-membership of the EU and the Swedish non-membership of NATO and 
their strategy choices, and moreover what implications this has on the countries. It sets out 
to explain Norway’s approach to the EU and Sweden’s approach to NATO and what its 
consequences and advantages are, through the perspective of MLG. Previous research has 
studied the countries’ relationships with the respective organization individually. The 
purpose of this thesis is to do a comparison in order to extend the understanding of the 
countries’ path dependency, what explains the decisions and their involvement in the layers 
of MLG, and the pursuit of state sovereignty. 
The Thesis will be guided by the following research questions: 
• What are the strategy choices in terms of the Norwegian approach to the EU and the 
Swedish approach to NATO when a formal membership is not possible?  
• What explains the Norwegian and Swedish strategy choices? 
1.3 Outline  
The first section outlines an overview of the theoretical perspective of MLG and decision-
making. The second section provides an analytical framework that will guide the analysis. 
The third section presents the methodology of the study. The fourth section evaluates the 
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cases of Norway and Sweden and their approach toward the EU and NATO. The fifth 
section provides a comparative analysis of these cases, which is followed by the conclusion.  
2 Understanding Multi-Level Governance 
MLG should be defined as fluid, negotiated, non-hierarchical exchanges between institutions 
at the transnational, national, regional, and local levels. Hierarchical models are being 
replaced by a more complex model of intergovernmental relations in which subnational 
authorities engage in direct exchange with supranational or global institutions and vice versa 
(Peters and Pierre 2001: 131, Bache and Flinders 2010: 75).  
The term of MLG emerged first in the study of the European Community and the EU (Bache 
and Flinders 2010: 107). MLG was proposed as a useful concept for understanding some of 
the decision-making dynamics of the EU. MLG quickly became a catch-all phrase that 
indicated phenomena taking place at three analytical levels: the ones of political 
mobilization, of policy-making arrangements, and of state structures (Piattoni 2010: 17-18).  
MLG has a wider cast of actors than the traditional models of intergovernmental relations, 
and it should be expected that public as well as non-public actors are involved in 
governance. The diversity of actors tends to create multiple linkages between governance 
processes at different levels. Moreover, transnational institutions are in direct 
communication with subnational actors or vice versa, so MLG should not be regarded as a 
hierarchical order of governance (Bache and Flinders 2010: 82-84).  
Countries nowadays are characterized by complex contingencies. Formal authority has 
gradually been dispersed from central states both up to supranational institutions and down 
to regional and local governments. The 1980s and 1990s have seen the creation of a large 
number of transnational regimes, some of which exercise supranational authority. 
Additionally, public and private networks of diverse kinds have multiplied from the local to 
the international level (Bache and Flinders 2010: 15).  
The subnational governments have direct access to the European Commission, they mobilize 
directly in Brussels, they are formally represented in an European assembly, they interact 
with each other across national borders, and some participate in the Council of Ministers. 
The multiplication of channels for subnational mobilization is part of a broader 
transformation in the EU, from state-centric to MLG (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 81). MLG 
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should empower the regional entities but one has to take into account that the positive 
democratic nature of this type of governance should not be exaggerated. The development of 
complex MLG systems tends to strengthen the EU and national bureaucratic actors at the 
expense of subnational actors (Peters and Pierre 2009: 96).     
The “actor-centeredness” of MLG emphasized how the different levels were traversed and 
linked by actors moving rather freely across formally still existent levels of government and 
spheres of authority. The new processes were not just multi-level but also multi-actor. MLG 
theory began to be applied to the exploration of the arrangements for the production of EU 
polices and to the functioning of the EU (Piattoni 2010: 20). In the context of negotiation, 
there is a mix of opportunity structure, money, and actors. The EU represents a dense set of 
interactions, and a sophisticated decision-making process, albeit one that is too complex to 
easily understand. Although third parties do not easily penetrate into the EU subsystem, it 
does happen. The US is the main “Trojan horse”, but Iceland, Norway, and Turkey also have 
inside tracks (Hill and Smith 2011: 470).  
The MLG perspective is analytically important simply by the fact that Norway and Sweden 
are cases of MLG by internalizing EU and NATO norms and do in turn abide by other levels 
of governance. The states act through negotiations between the levels of governance, and 
additionally, there is a mix of MLG and global governance in both cases. Governance is a 
complex process involving multiple actors pursuing a variety of individual and 
organizational goals, as well as pursuing the collective goals of the society (Peters and Pierre 
2009: 92). There is a general assumption that the best decision is the most rational. 
However, rational behavior is based upon purpose and rationality is an ability to link means 
to ends (Russett and Starr 1996: 222). Rationality designates a style of behavior that is 
appropriate to the attainment of given goals, within the limits forced by given conditions and 
constraints (Simon 1972: 161). Rational decisions are especially difficult in governance 
where there are multiple sets of preferences, and that is why the perspective of bounded 
rationality becomes important for this thesis.   
The argument for plan A in this thesis is that the states apply for membership in the 
international organizations. In the Norwegian case, there have been two attempts to join the 
EC/EU. The second time, the elite lost the 1994 referendum but insisted that the European 
cooperation was crucial for Norway. Plan B, namely the EEA agreement, has been put into 
practice since the day after that referendum. In the Swedish case, I argue that the political 
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leadership did not consider the plan A and seized on plan B as a first move, namely the 
NATO Partnership.  
MLG and collective action among sovereign states are closely connected. In order for 
collective solutions to work, sovereign states are required to cede parts of their autonomy to 
transnational institutions and systems. In both cases, there is a decision-making process on 
many levels where actors achieve their objectives partly through negotiation. They 
suboptimize through MLG in order to achieve their goals.  
2.1 Decision-making in a MLG context 
A decision-making process implies that a series of actions or assessments lead to action and 
implementation of a decision. A further step is to relate to the information and reach what is 
the best thing to do. And finally, one needs to choose an alternative of action and then 
implement the alternative. This is not an easy process but a process covering many 
considerations, many interests, much information and also uncertainty (Jacobsen and 
Thorsvik 2014: 285-287).  
“When the limits of rationality are viewed from the individual’s standpoint, they 
fall into three categories: he is limited by his unconscious skills, habits, and 
reflexes; he is limited by his values and conceptions of purpose, which may 
diverge from the organization goals; he is limited by the extent of his knowledge 
and information” (Simon 1997: 323).  
The idea that individuals act rationally is central in decision theories. The concept of 
rationality within decision theories implies how to make decisions about what should be 
done when faced with a problem. The ideal rational model implies that the individual can act 
fully rationally, by having clear goals and full information about the alternatives and does in 
turn choose the alternative based on the best alternative in order to reach the goal. However, 
in real life there are circumstances that make it harder for individuals to act according to the 
ideal of rationality (Jacobsen and Thorsvik 2014: 287-288).  
“Rationality, then, does not determine behavior. Within the area of rationality 
behavior is perfectly flexible and adaptable to abilities, goals, and knowledge. 
Instead, behavior is determined by the irrational and nonrational elements that 
bound the area of rationality” (Simon 1997: 323).  
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The decision-makers, the individuals, are thus rationally bounded. They cannot act fully 
rationally since no one has full information of all possible solutions and their consequences, 
in order to choose the alternative that most certainly maximize the benefits (Jacobsen and 
Thorsvik 2014: 289).  
The assumption that individuals are rationally bound implies that although they have goals 
those objectives may often be ambiguous and changing. One assesses some possible 
solutions and some consequences of these alternatives. Furthermore, one assesses the 
alternatives sequentially, gradually as one has the ability to examine them. Finally, one 
selects the first satisfactory alternative that appears. The type of decision behavior that is 
described as satisficing means that one chooses an alternative that is “good enough” without 
surely knowing whether it is the best alternative. Instead of maximizing, the decision-maker 
selects the first alternative that is satisfactory. Uncertainty and ambiguity become two 
central elements in all decisions that are based on bounded rationality. Satisficing means that 
the information one is exposed to, the sequence in which the alternatives are presented, and 
rules and norms for the choice between the alternatives are important elements for 
understanding which choice that is selected. In turn, it is important to study in which way 
one chooses to search for alternative solutions, in order to understand a decision (Jacobsen 
and Thorsvik 2014: 289-290, Simon 1957: 24).   
How can the relationship between Norway and the EU and the relationship between Sweden 
and NATO be understood? Why has the relationship turned out this way and what are the 
consequences?  
3 Analytical framework 
This section provides an analytical framework that structures the analysis of the Thesis. It is 
necessary that the study possesses a proposed analytical framework in order to not be overly 
descriptive. The aim of this section is to define what will be explained and what is likely to 
explain the variation in the dependent variable. As mentioned above, the Thesis will analyze 
Norway’s approach to the EU and Sweden’s approach to NATO. The dependent variable is 
the choice of strategy and strategy implementation, in terms of Norwegian approach to the 
EU and Swedish approach to NATO. The first independent variable is the public opinion’s 
preference for individual action and the second independent variable is the elite’s perceived 
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need for collective action, in other words the leaders’ analysis of the international political 
and economic situation.  
None of the cases are simple and the trajectory to the present situation is complex. These 
relationships have to be placed in a wider context. The relationship between Norway and the 
EU and the relationship between Sweden and NATO of today are contingent on what 
happened in the past. Moreover, the decision-makers are surrounded by several layers of 
environment, both domestic and external, which constrain and limit the decision-makers of 
what they are able or likely to do (Russett and Starr 1996: 219). The decision-makers are 
constrained by the structure of opportunities, potential costs and benefits, and risks. They 
want to maximize the control, in terms of regulating and determining, that they have both 
within the state and internationally (Archer 2005: 11). However, the non-membership is 
arguably bound to affect the balance since both Norway and Sweden have fewer instruments 
with which to implement its tactics.   
An institution is a relatively stable collection of rules and organized practices.  Institutions 
are carriers of identities and roles and they are indicators of a policy’s character, history, and 
idea. They provide links that tie citizens together regardless of the many things that divide 
them. Institutions shape, enable, and constrain political actors as they act within a logic of 
appropriate action (March and Olsen 2011: 160). In the decision-making process, the 
alternatives that are chosen are considered to be appropriate means for reaching desired ends 
(Simon 1997: 73). Organizations are best understood as acting rationally only within 
narrowed boundaries, with their range of rational action determined by their own routines, 
norms, and interests (Peters 2002: 7-8). Thus, bounded rationality advocates a lower degree 
of rationality and seeks outcomes that are “good enough” rather than utility maximizing 
(Simon 1957: 24).  
The choices of strategy and the strategy implementation are set in a political and economic 
context, which varies over time. The importance of the EU in Norway has most likely 
increased successively, while the importance of NATO in Sweden seems to have fluctuated 
depending on Soviet/Russia’s international aggression. In both cases, strategy has to relate 
to long-term objectives. Membership decisions are fundamental to essentially all policy 
areas and to the perception of the country by actors in its external environment.  If Norway 
joins the EU, Norway cannot exit the organization after some years. Similarly, if Sweden 
decides to join NATO when Russian military aggression increases, Sweden cannot just leave 
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the organization this aggression decreases. The decisions are seemingly irreversible. This is 
certainly a cost-benefit evaluation that must be done in the choice of strategy and strategy 
implementation.  
Given the long-term objectives and consequences of membership in international 
organizations we need to understand path dependency. A basic idea is that the policy 
choices, and especially decisions regarding membership in international organizations, made 
when an institution is being formed or when a policy is initiated will have a continuing and 
largely determinate influence over the policy far into the future. The term for describing this 
argument is path dependency, which implies that when a government program is launched 
those initial policy choices tend to persist (Peters 2005: 71). Small choices in institutional 
arrangements can have remarkable consequences at a later date and some policy choices 
may prove irreversible (Peters, Pierre, and King 2005: 1287).  
Historical institutional theory will be used in order to understand the difference between the 
decision points and the continuity of the politics vis-à-vis the EU and NATO. There is a 
timeline with formative moments and path dependencies, with the postwar era as a starting 
point since the EU and NATO came about as a consequence of the World War II. The two 
cases are not synchronic but can anyhow be compared in parallel. Although these countries 
are not formally members of these international organizations, there is a close cooperation 
between the country and the organization. Plan B is thus about the elite’s leeway in a path 
dependent state.   
Institutions and their decisions are considered path-dependent. The fundamental concept of 
historical institutionalism is that conditions and ideas to the founding of an institution are 
crucial in order to understand its following behavior, and will continue to influence the types 
of policies that it will make (Peters 1998: 18). Moreover, one can observe the cases of 
Norway and Sweden through the perspective of the general problem of small states. Today’s 
international organizations are complex and the countries have their path dependency of 
previous choices. Therefore, everyone cannot participate in everything all the time. As a 
consequence, there is a general challenge of how to relate to the “half-membership” or non-
membership (Britz 2016).  
The small state problem includes strategic suboptimization. The cooperation is not as perfect 
as it could be since some things just need to be accepted, such as the lack of influence and 
information. In other words, it is a situation that is less optimal. Choice, in so far as it is 
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rational and aware of its objective conditions, involves a selection of an alternative among 
several. The alternatives vary with regard to the consequences that come from them, and an 
analysis of decision-making in its objective aspects will refer primarily to these variable 
consequences of choice. Concentration on the rational aspects of human behavior should 
therefore not be interpreted as an assertion that human beings are always or generally 
rational (Simon 1997: 72). The model of rationality has high requirements and the countries 
are therefore suboptimizing since all requirements cannot be completed. The decisions are 
influenced by strategic choices and self-interest. However, these choices of self-interest are 
bound to not being fully maximized and mostly due to domestic politics where the elite is to 
relate to a relatively negative public opinion. 
Plan B will be the second best option, thus a “good enough” outcome when a membership is 
not politically possible and the countries need to relate to the organizations, for practical and 
economic reasons. The political leadership has negotiated a plan B in order to achieve 
important collective goals through international cooperation. The theoretical definition of 
plan A is that a country applies for membership in the international organizations. Then 
whether there has been a plan A is an empirical question. Sweden did never plan to join 
NATO and implemented plan B directly by negotiating the partnership agreement in 1994 
and other bilateral cooperation. Norway had a plan A, which was to join the EU. The EEA 
agreement became plan B the day after a majority of the Norwegian population rejected an 
EU membership in the 1994 referendum. Conceptually, plan B and what the political 
leadership did fit in the MLG model.  
The institutional perspective and the emphasis of long-term objectives and path dependency 
are arguments for Simon’s bounded rationality. It is rather difficult to be a utility- 
maximizing actor in a context where the decision alternatives are shaped to such a high 
extent by the demand for long-term objectives and where the dependency of other actors’ 
decisions and behavior is considerable.  
4 Methodology 
This section introduces the research design of the study and thereafter the methods for 
analysis. In short, it is a qualitative study including both interviews and texts.  
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4.1 A comparative case study 
In order to study the phenomenon of choice of strategy and strategy implementation when 
approaching the EU and NATO, a comparative case study is chosen as a representative 
research design. The case study can briefly be explained as a research design that facilitates 
the exploration of a phenomenon within its context using various forms of data.  
The choice of a case study offers an in-depth analysis of a complex social phenomenon in an 
accurate and precise manner. One of the most prominent advocates of case study research, 
Robert Yin (2009: 18), defines it as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. 
There are different choices of research strategies and each is a different technique of 
collecting and analyzing empirical evidence (Yin 1989: 15). The case study involves process 
tracing, which means that it is not about establishing the size of effects but about connecting 
the cause to the effect.  
There are preexisting theories that will help to explain the individual cases. In a theory-
consuming study the specific cases are in the center (Esaiasson et al. 2004: 40-41). This case 
research provides with detailed information on the cases and insights into the real world of 
politics in the countries studied (Peters 2013: 190). It also allows for inclusion of a much 
wider range of information into the explanation of an outcome. The case method is thus 
suitable for interpretative analysis but not well suited for developing scientific 
generalizations (Peters 2013: 190).  
Most critics on the case study research are based on the aspects of validity and reliability. 
Critics generally stress that single cases offer a scanty basis for generalizing (Yin 1989: 43). 
However, a case study does not have a larger universe and neither is the generalization the 
primary interest of this thesis since the choice of two cases is based upon the wish to do an 
extensive in-depth study. Many inquiries have limited ambitions when expressing 
themselves universally. This mainly refers to the theory consuming study whose analysis on 
historically specified cases is regarded as interesting in itself (Esaiasson et al. 2004: 171).  
It is generally argued that it is problematic to make final conclusions on a basis of a 
comparative design. However, the carefully planned and executed study forms a 
contribution to the society’s effort of securing knowledge (Esaiasson et al. 2004: 116). 
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Despite the choice of few cases, they can still be compared to similar cases such as Denmark 
or Iceland.  
4.2 Material 
In order to answer the research question of this study, two types of data are used. Firstly, 
data on Norwegian and Swedish strategies is collected as a consequence of the research 
itself and new data is thus generated by interviews. Secondly, secondary sources such as 
literature and documents provide important information for my research (Teorell and 
Svensson 2007: 87, Hellevik 2002: 100).  
The first research method for this study is the secondary data analysis. Books and documents 
such as articles and reports are examined and analyzed for frequencies or contingencies. By 
using literature and documents, the study can track the political process of choices and 
strategies in Norway and Sweden. For instance, the Norwegian Official Report (NOU) of 
2012 is a key document for the Norwegian case (Stake 1995: 68). Apart from texts, a radio 
interview from Sveriges Radio and a seminar at the Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs provide valuable information for the Swedish case.   
In order to gain further insights about the cases and its strategies, additional material is 
required. The second research method for this study is therefore the self-made data 
generated by interviews. The key purpose is not to get yes and no answers but a description 
of an episode, an explanation, or a linkage. The interview is thus the main road to multiple 
facts and it is chosen based on the assumption that it is a generally safe way to obtain 
specific information (Stake 1995: 64-65).  
Findings are based on three interviews held in Oslo and in Stockholm. In terms of 
informants, I have done a strategic selection since I wanted respondents that are experts on 
the topic. Ulf Sverdrup, the Director or the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, is 
the informant of the Norwegian case. Anna Wieslander, the Deputy Director of the Swedish 
Institute of International Affairs, and Malena Britz, researcher at the Swedish Defense 
University, are the informants of the Swedish case. I consider that they are good 
representatives for different aspects and areas of policy in the Norwegian and Swedish cases, 
due to their experience and in-depth information within the field of study. All interviews are 
recorded, after permission was granted, and transcribed in their full length.   
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The interviews are used as supplement to the literature and documents. The aim with the 
interviews is to gather information about the cases as well as an understanding for the 
informants’ perspectives. The interviewees have therefore the character of being both 
informants and respondents (Esaiasson et al. 2004: 227-228). There are different ways of 
carrying through interviews and an important dividing line is the structure in the questions 
and its answers. The interviews are semi-structured for a broader understanding in order to 
explain the Norwegian and Swedish choices and processes. The interviews have thus a lower 
degree of structure in order to allow the formulation of the questions to vary depending on 
who is interviewed. They are initiated in a more informative way with general information, 
which follows by more specific information or perceptions for an understanding of possible 
challenges or opportunities for the future. It registers unexpected answers that would have 
been excluded if having a stricter set of questions. The ambition of the semi-structured 
interviews is to allow for reflection and it is also designed to be open for additional themes 
or perceptions (Teorell and Svensson 2007: 88-89, Esaiasson et al. 2004: 279).   
A combination of these methods, data specifically collected for the purpose of this research 
and preexisting data, will provide information for the analysis and to answer the research 
questions. 
5 Case: Norway and the EU  
Norway is not formally a member country of the EU. At the same time, Norway is 
connected to large parts of the EU cooperation and has implemented much of the EU 
legislation. Norway is the third-party country that has joined up the closest to the EU, from 
Brussels’ point of view. One indication of this is that Norway make a substantial 
contribution to the EU budget, and by paying €656 million to the EU and receiving back 
around €100 million it makes Norway a net contributor (Sverdrup 2004: 13, Open Europe 
2015). This implies that Norway is both outside and inside the EU (NOU 2012: 35). 
Norway’s relation to the European cooperation is perhaps the most important controversy in 
modern Norwegian politics. The issue dates back to 1961 when the proposal of Norwegian 
membership of the common market arose the first time, with a very heated debate and 
special alliances of supporters and opponents. The case was provisionally shelved in 1963, 
but remained on the political agenda through the upcoming period, both actively and 
inactively. The debate peaked with the referendums of 1972 and 1994 and the EU debate has 
	   19	  
so far resulted in three government crises, in 1971, 1972, and 1990 (Narud and Valen 2011: 
182-183). 
5.1 The path to the ambivalent relationship 
The geographical position at the outer edge of Northern Europe has traditionally defined 
Norway’s foreign policy orientation. The leadership has intended to prevent involvement in 
wars and conflicts on the continent, while the westward contact toward the UK and later on 
the US has been more open. The cultural influence from continental European countries, 
especially Germany, has always been great although the political inclination has 
predominantly been Atlantic (Aardal and Valen 1995: 111). Norway struggled for its 
autonomy in the nineteenth century, first against Denmark and later against Sweden. But this 
autonomy was threatened after the independence of 1905, in the World War I and then more 
noticeably by the German invasion on April 9 1940. Joining NATO in 1949 provided some 
elements of influence for a small state that were missing in previous security policy. It was 
recognized that Norway needed external help to secure the defense. However, Norway 
steered its own course after the World War II in economic, social, and environmental 
policies (Acher 2005: 1-2).  
A series of initiatives through cooperation and economic revival followed World War II, 
aiming to assure peace on the embattled European continent. At a starting point, the 
European integration process did awaken limited interest in the Norwegian political 
environment. Measures that could reduce tension between earlier enemies were seen as 
politically important, but it was at the same time declared that the continental European 
integration concerned Norway to a smaller extent. The lack of interest can be seen in the 
light of that Norway looked more to the UK and the US after the World War II (NOU 2012: 
45). The reason for this is the fact that Europe was destroyed and the case of Norway was 
rather special due to the traumatic relations to Germany since the German occupation, and 
there was consequently an immense resent and fear toward Germany. Britain and the US 
were the prominent powers that had fought against Germany during the World War II. 
Additionally, the ties to the UK were special as the Norwegian in-exile-government was in 
London during and after the occupation, and the Norwegian royal family was also British 
since King Haakon VII was married to the Princess of the United Kingdom (Sverdrup 2016).  
Norway had very close economic ties with the UK, its most important trade partner, and the 
UK was by then the economic power in terms of trade (Dinan 2004: 139, Sverdrup 2016). 
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Norway followed the path of the UK up to the 1972 referendum. This choice did initially 
mean an active support for the British proposal of a free trade area for all the members of the 
OEEC (former OECD). The proposal aimed to assure British export to the continent and was 
originally an attempt to prevent the establishment of the European Economic Community 
(EEC). Additionally, the British proposal of an intergovernmental cooperation of industrial 
goods was very close to the solution that Norway wished for. However, Charles de Gaulle 
made it clear that the proposal would not get France’s support. The foundation of the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) reflects a reaction on this as a fallback initiative. 
The EFTA treaty was signed by the UK, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden, 
and Austria in 1960 and it was an expression for a new British strategy (NOU 2012: 45-46). 
The main purpose was to increase pressure on the EEC to reopen negotiations for a free 
trade area (Dinan 2004: 91).  
When the UK, shortly after the creation of EFTA, decided to apply for EEC membership the 
issue was raised on the Norwegian political agenda as well. At this point, the EEC 
membership raised an essential engagement in the population, especially on the no-side, and 
organizations were established with the aim of preventing membership. The opinion poll 
indicated that a majority of the population was in favor of a membership but France’s veto 
against British membership in 1963 meant that there would not be any negotiations for the 
Norwegian application. The veto of the British application was due to Charles de Gaulle’s 
opposition to the Nassau agreement. This deal to provide US missiles to Britain’s 
independent nuclear force was, according to de Gaulle, a sign of British subservience to the 
US and that a British membership would pose political difficulties for France. Moreover, the 
British reservations were large and they remained skeptical of supranationalism, committed 
to the Commonwealth, and attached to an agriculture system mismatched with the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Agriculture became the most controversial issue between Britain 
and the EEC (NOU 2012: 46, Dinan 2004: 101).  
Britain needed to join for economic reasons but the issue continued to divide domestic 
opinion. However, Prime Minister Harold Wilson kept arguing the case for membership on 
solid economic grounds. De Gaulle wanted Britain to accept the CAP and distance itself 
from the US. Wilson was not able to convince Charles de Gaulle that British accession to the 
European Community (EC) was compatible with French economic and strategic interests. 
Wilson agreed to abide by the CAP but he was more guarded on the question of Anglo-
American relations (Dinan 2004: 109-110).  
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Norway’s second EEC membership application was submitted in 1967. The Norwegian key 
objective was to ensure markets for Norwegian export industry. The application was 
supported by an unanimous Storting but since France remained its position against British 
membership it was not on the map for Norway to apply without the UK, and there were no 
negotiations this time either for Norwegian membership (NOU 2012: 46).  
In 1970, the Storting adopted a renovation of the Norwegian application of 1967 and the 
negotiations between Norway and the EC lasted from June 1971 to January 1972. The 
central issue of this application was the primary industries’ conditions. The member 
countries of the EC could not accept Norway’s demands for special arrangements. 
Nevertheless, the Norwegian negotiators still got considerable support and the EC accepted 
the special interests within the areas of agriculture and fishery, which resulted in a signing of 
the accession address in 1972. There were strong euroskeptical elements in Norway and the 
Norwegians liked to point out that having become independent from Sweden in relatively 
recent times, Norway was doubtful of joining another union of states. Farmers were worried 
that subsidies would fall if they participated in CAP; fishermen resented the common 
fisheries policy; and the conservatives were concerned about the social impact of accession. 
Those opposed to membership, from all socio-economic groups but representing especially 
agricultural and fishing interests, polled 53.5 percent in the referendum of 1972 and a 
Norwegian EC membership was thus rejected (NOU 2012: 46-47, Dinan 139-141). 
Moreover, the resistance was also part of a popular protest not least from the left and from 
the intellectuals. Most political parties were divided on the issue, except for the 
Conservative Party.  
Norway’s “new European policy” in the 1970s was not only directed toward the EC but to 
Europe as a whole. Thus, pursuing active politics toward the EC turned out to be rather 
challenging. On the one hand, many people in Norway perceived that pursuing these politics 
was an attempt to sneak Norway in to the organization. On the other hand, the EC countries 
were not that enthusiastic toward Norwegian accession as a consequence of Norway’s 
rejection of membership in the previous referendum. For the government it was nevertheless 
an aim to strengthen the ties with the EC under the free trade agreement of 1973, between 
the EC and EFTA, negotiated by the Korvald’s Cabinet (NOU 2012: 47).  
Brundtland’s Second Cabinet, a minority Labour government, declared in its 
“Europamelding” of 1987 that Norway’s cooperation with the EC would have to be enlarged 
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and strengthened within the framework of the country’s relationship to the Community. The 
message stated that Norway had to conform to the development regarding the 
implementation of the EC Single Market. The rationale of the Norwegian customization was 
to prevent new obstacles for the Norway’s economic relationship with the EC. A 
development toward full political and economic union was not considered realistic from the 
government’s 1987 perspective. The government was concerned that the “Europamelding” 
would not lead to a new membership debate and the Minister of Foreign Affairs rejected 
later the statement that the “Europamelding” was to be interpreted as a first step toward EC 
membership. The government’s perception was that Norway would remain outside the EC 
for many years. At the same time, the EC became more careful to let the EFTA countries 
closer to the negotiations. The development of the single market was foremost the EC’s own 
case and that only its members should benefit from it. The EC saw the importance of 
avoiding agreements that could enable non-members to interfere with the Community’s 
internal decision-making process. The situation changed in the beginning of 1989 when the 
President of the European Commission Jacques Delors launched a more ambitious and well-
prepared proposal how to organize the cooperation. He opened up for a more structured 
partnership between the EFTA and the EC (NOU 2012: 49-51).  
The European Economic Area (EEA) was established as a response to the wish from the 
EFTA countries to access the EC Single Market. The EEA negotiations between the EC and 
the EFTA lasted from June 1990 to October 1991 (NOU 2012: 53, Sverdrup 2016). The 
EEA agreement was presented to the Storting in “Stortingsproposisjon nr. 100”, advised by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 15 1992 and approved in the Council of State the 
same day (NOU 2012: 60). It entered into force in Norway in January 1994, the same year 
that the agreement was established. The EEA agreement replaced the bilateral agreement of 
free trade in industrial goods between Norway and the EC with a multilateral agreement 
enabling Norway as part of a single market without physical boarders, that apart from goods 
also included capital, labor, and services (NOU 2012: 44).  
Prime Minister Brundtland, during her Third Cabinet, had emphasized in the beginning of 
1992 that Norway would need to submit a new application for membership, regardless of the 
results of the EEA negotiations (NOU 2012: 59). The referendum took place in November 
1994. Brundtland emphasized that the referendum did not ask about European integration 
but whether Norway should apply for Norwegian EU membership (Sverdrup 2016). The 
yes-side lost their second referendum despite the vast resources at its disposal, among them 
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support from central elites and from an almost unanimous media (Aardal and Valen 1995: 
148).    
Norwegian governments have, between 1962 and 1992, submitted four applications aiming 
to negotiate for an EU membership. The applications of 1962 and 1967 were stranded on 
French resistance for British accession. The first referendum took place in 1972 and resulted 
in a majority of 53.5 percent rejecting Norwegian accession (NOU 2012: 45, 47). The next 
and last attempt to join the EU was also rejected by a majority in the referendum of 1994 
(NOU 2012: 44). The no-side polled 52.2 percent and the referendum had a high turnout of 
89 percent (Narud, Hveem, and Høyland 2010: 351).  
5.2 Political parties and public opinion  
Norwegian politics are based on consensus and there is a general agreement between the 
political parties on a large range of policy areas. The EU membership issue, however, has 
created tensions and a turbulence that is in contrast to this peaceful image of Norwegian 
politics (Aardal and Valen 1995: 113). This issue has been one of the largest controversies 
in Norwegian politics in the postwar period and the EC/EU referendums of 1972 and 1994 
mobilized the voters in a different way. The EU issue has consisted of an underlying tension 
in Norwegian politics, potential to split governments and parties; before, during, and after 
the two referendums (NOU 2012: 46, 269).  
The question of EU membership involves the country’s relation to other states and 
practically all domestic policy areas. The issue needs to be evaluated in an international 
perspective and analyzed in relation to the underlying national conflicts and interests. The 
core of the opposition toward EU membership consists of an alliance between the primary 
industries, the radicals from the cities, and the population in the periphery. A similar alliance 
formed the core of the left movement during the constitutional battles of the 19th century. 
The EU opinion relates to social structure, demography, and party affiliation (Aardal and 
Valen 1995: 110-111, 115).  
The EU membership issue was put on the political agenda during the fall of 1989. The 
tension in the public opinion was moderate despite that the well-known political opposites 
appeared during the prior EEA negotiations. The main adversaries in the EU issue, the 
Conservative Party and the Center Party, formed government together with the Christian 
Democratic Party in 1989. It turned out that the EU issue was highly politically loaded and 
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the Syse’s Cabinet split only a year after entering office. It was replaced by a Labour Party 
minority government (Aardal and Valen 1995: 108).  
The EU issue was to dominate the national election of 1993 and some of the arguments and 
the political atmosphere of the EC debates from the early 1970s returned. The no-parties, 
especially the Center Party, concentrated this issue in their campaign while the Conservative 
Party and the Labour Party did not want to make it a campaign issue with the main argument 
that the upcoming referendum would decide about membership. Two out of three voters 
perceived the EU issue as important during the national election of 1993. The no-parties, the 
Center Party and the Socialist Left Party, advanced while the Conservative Party and the 
Labour Party declined (Aardal and Valen 1995: 108, 110).  
With regard to the membership issue, the frontlines between the Norwegian political parties 
are relatively stable. That is to say that the Center Party and the Socialist Left Party are 
apparent no-parties while the Conservative Party is the most apparent yes-party. The Labour 
Party indicates positive interest, but wants to postpone the decision until further notice. The 
position of the Liberal Party and the Christian Democratic Party can be interpreted in the 
same general direction, while Progress Party stands neutral (Narud and Valen 2011: 162-
163). The Red Electoral Alliance was a party collection of left-wing groups and took an 
apparent stance against Norwegian EU membership. It dissolved in 2007 during the 
founding of the Red Party. The party remains its opposition of both EU membership and the 
EEA agreement (Rødt 2016).   
The Center Party and the Socialist Left Party are still perceived as credible opponents of the 
EEA at the same time as they have been in government and have worked with the EU on 
new areas. Similarly, the Conservative Party is perceived to be a credible party in favor of 
EU membership although they have not proposed membership during their government 
(NOU 2012: 272). Two parties, the Center Party and the Socialist Left Party, state in their 
political program that they wish to renounce the EEA and Schengen agreements. One party, 
the Conservative Party, has stated that they wish for a Norwegian EU membership. 
Moreover, the Labour Party believes that a membership should give Norway more political 
influence and more opportunities to promote Norwegian interests than what the EEA 
agreement allows for (NOU 2012: 273).  
The European Movement and No to the EU are the principal interest groups advocating the 
EU issue, the former founded in 1949 and the latter was founded as an organization in 1990  
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(NOU 2012: 277). The central no-argument was that membership would, in different ways, 
weaken the Norwegian self-determination. The central yes-argument was that it was crucial 
to ensure duty-free access to the European market (NOU 2012: 46).  
The European integration has in many contexts, not only in Norway, been declared as ruled 
by elites and where the population’s participation and influence play a marginal role (Narud 
and Valen 2011: 182-183). Additionally, the neoliberal ideology that many saw in the EU 
institutions has been criticized to some extent.   
Graph 1: The Norwegians’ attitude toward EU membership 1989-1994 (percent) 
 
Source: Aardal and Valen (1995) 
There has been a considerable variation in people’s attitude toward EU membership over 
time. There has almost always been a majority against EU membership although the 
percentage point difference has been smaller at times. The no-side had already in the start of 
1989 a lead of 16 percentage points in comparison to the yes-side and the amount of 
resistance was over 20 percent. Toward the national election of 1993 there was an enormous 
fluctuation in the direction of no. The gap between yes and no was now 35 percentage 
points. The yes-side strengthened toward September of 1994 although the no-side had the 
lead. The no-side had the lead with a majority, but the gap decreased in the last phase of the 
campaign and there were finally 17 percentage points of difference (Aardal and Valen 1995: 
129-130).  
The development in the opinion can be seen in light of the character of the campaign. An 
information organization was established already in 1988 that pressed opposition toward the 
suggested EEA agreement, which later on formalized into the organization No to the EU. On 
the other side was the European Movement, which was a weaker organization. The 
campaign for the referendum started in 1989 when the Center Party and the Socialist Left 
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EU supporters, however with a lower profile. On the other hand, the Labour Party, the 
Christian Democratic Party, and the Progress Party needed several years to clarify their 
stance. In sum, the no-parties and No to the EU did not miss their opportunity to lift their 
message while the yes-parties awaited the results from the negotiations between Norway and 
the EU (Aardal and Valen 1995: 130-131).  
The no-vote in the Norwegian case can be reflected in the interaction of the politics, of 
interest groups, and of ideas and identity. The first explanation is that the government lost 
the vote by making some strategic mistakes. They started the yes campaign very late while 
the opposition had started to construct their organization already in 1989. The second 
explanation is the role played by the socio-economic groups, and the result of the 
referendum reflected the economic interest of the country. As a consequence of societal 
resistance, the elite could not fulfill the hope of joining the EU (Ingebritsen 1998: 143). The 
societal triumph was a response to the requirements of the leading economic sectors. The oil 
and gas sector had its own opt-out from the single market and the state-subsided agriculture 
and fishery sectors mobilized against the government cooperation with the EU. The oil 
revenue gave Norway the economic capacity to wait. Norway may have pursued a different 
track if the political economy had been less dependent on petroleum and more dependent on 
manufacturing (Archer 2005: 58-60, Ingebritsen 1998: 31, 182). The third explanation 
regards identity. However, the discourse in the EU debate of 1994 was more varied than in 
1972 and it tended to focus on whether membership was the right form of linkage to the EU 
and on self-interest, rather than primarily about issues of national identity. The interest 
groups of agriculture and fisheries thought they would suffer from EC membership. They 
were able to capture an important part of the national discourse in the 1972 referendum. This 
was less necessary in the 1994 referendum since a sufficient section of the population was 
persuaded to vote “no” for their own interests, such as their welfare benefits, their standard 
of living, and their jobs (Archer 2005: 61-63).  
The resistance toward EU membership has increased as for 2005 and onward. This could be 
influenced by short-term outcomes of economic conjunctures or contextual conditions of 
international character. The development of the EU could also have an impact on the 
variation, especially if it is on the media’s agenda. For instance, when Sweden rejected the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the referendum of 2003, an improvement for the 
no-side could be observed in Norway. In sum, the public opinion has the last years moved in 
favor of the no-side while support of membership is a minority (Narud, Hveem, and 
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Høyland 2010: 351-352, 354). In the opinion polls of 2014, 70 percent were against an EU 
membership and 20.2 percent were in favor of a Norwegian membership (NTB 2014). 
5.3 Norway’s relationship with the EU 
The relation to Europe made its first move in 1988 when the EEA negotiations were initiated 
(Aardal and Valen 1995: 108). Since the second no-vote, Norway’s relationship with the EU 
has not only been based on the EEA but also the Schengen agreement and on an association 
with many aspects of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. The relationship has 
been ambivalent because Norway, in terms of the people, the politicians, and the civil 
society, has been torn between maintaining the country’s autonomy and increasing its 
influence in specific areas internationally (Archer 2005: 1).  
The EFTA gathers Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland (Sejersted, Arnesen, 
Rognstad, and Kolstad 2011: 32). It is an intergovernmental trade bloc that operates in 
parallel with the EU. In addition to the EFTA membership, Norway is an EEA member. The 
EEA agreement brings the EU member states and the three EEA EFTA states together 
(EFTA 2016). Through the EEA agreement and the Schengen agreement, Norway is tied to 
the formally supranational pillar of the EU. Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway are tied to 
the EU Single Market through the EEA, and the development of common regulations aims 
to remove obstacles to a free exchange of goods and free movement of capital, services, and 
people within the EU and the EEA. The EEA agreement does at the same time open up for 
matters within environmental protection, education, research, consumer issues, and social 
issues. The agreement does however not include the agricultural and fisheries policy 
(Christensen et al. 2012: 199). 
The EEA agreement is dynamic in the sense that Norway undertakes to follow the EU 
legislation continuously in the areas that the agreement involves and it implies that 
sovereignty is transferred from national level to EU level (Christensen et al. 2012: 207-208, 
NOU 2012: 44).  
Since the EU legislation, in terms of directives and regulations, can require law changes in 
Norway, the government needs to consult the Storting before giving consent in the EEA 
Joint Committee. As a consequence, the Storting established a consultative body where to 
discuss EEA issues in 1994, which today is named the European Committee. It consists of 
members of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense and members of the 
Parliamentary Delegation to the EFTA and the EEA. However, since the legislative 
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decisions that the EU presents for the EFTA in the EEA Joint Committee are already 
decided and final from the EU side, it only remains a question of accepting or not accepting 
in the European Committee of the Storting. At this stage, there is therefore no chance to 
influence the outcome other than a possible vetoing (Christensen et al. 2012: 209-210). The 
EEA agreement is in theory of international law character, which implies that the EEA 
countries, in contrast to the EU countries, always need to consent before EU legislation is 
applicable in the EEA countries. But since vetoing can lead to that the EU, as a 
countermove, puts the EEA agreement or parts of it out of play, the veto has been considered 
but not used. The EEA is supranational in practice since all legislation concerning the single 
market, which is practically all EU legislation, is implemented in Norwegian legislation 
(Christensen et al. 2012: 199). This makes Norway, by 2016, very much EU adjusted. 
Norway’s special EU affiliation has a broader support in the public opinion. A majority of 
Norwegian voters were satisfied with the agreements and 64 percent perceived the EEA 
agreement as a good agreement for Norway (NOU 2012: 270). There are two different 
arguments with regard to the EEA agreement. Firstly, the ones that wish for an EU 
membership think that if Norway hold on to the EEA strategy then Norway will almost be 
an EU member and it will in turn be easier to join the EU. Secondly, the ones that are 
against an EU membership are divided into two groups. There are those stating that the best 
guarantee for non-membership is to continue with the EEA cooperation and there are those 
believing that the current cooperation is hopeless and that it cannot persist. There is a 
general consensus, even on the no-side, that the EEA is a good agreement because if 
Norway looses it, then there will be a referendum that will lead to a yes turnout. This is a 
difficult position since it is almost impossible to get away from the EEA agreement 
(Sverdrup 2016). 
5.4 Plan B 
The governments’ approach toward the EU has been considered functional and anti-federal 
since the governments have emphasized the economic aspects of the European integration 
while there has been less of interest to highlight the integration as a political project. The 
Center Party, the Socialist Left Party, and the Red Party still state in their political programs 
that Norway should renounce the EEA agreement. However, no political parties have neither 
submitted a proposal of resignation of the EEA agreement nor proposed an alternative 
affiliation. The EEA agreement has established a stable and relatively wide political 
consensus on Norway’s relation to the EU. In contrast to the EU that seemed divisive, the 
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EEA seems to have been more unifying and Norway’s special association with the EU 
appears to have broader support in the public opinion (NOU 2012: 44, 270-271, Sp 2016, 
SV 2016, Rødt 2016).  
Overall, the population and the elite did not reject the EEA agreement. In contrast, since 
Norway had this agreement one did not see the benefit of becoming an EU member. There 
was a wish to participate in the EU Single Market but the uncertainty whether the Euro was 
suitable for Norway dominated. Moreover, the rich oil deposits were discovered and 
developed in the 1980s leading Norway into a different financial track compared to 
elsewhere. In the 1994 debate there was thus a fear to lose control over oil resources and the 
national income, at least in the population if not among the political elite. Additionally, all 
the politically difficult policy areas, such as agriculture and fishery, were not included in the 
EEA agreement (Sverdrup 2016).  
Since Prime Minister Brundtland and the political elite did not accomplish to carry through 
plan A, which was to formally join the EU, the EEA agreement became plan B. However, 
the decision has since 1994 been to have a uniform and dynamic cooperation with the EU. 
That is the current strategy (Sverdrup 2016).  
6 Case: Sweden and NATO  
Despite the non-membership of NATO, Sweden is connected to large parts of the NATO 
cooperation and is one of the partners that has joined up the closest to NATO. One 
indication of this is that Sweden has been identified as making particularly significant 
contributions to NATO operations and it was agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit that Sweden 
is one out of five “Enhanced Opportunity” partners with whom NATO will deepen the 
practical cooperation and dialogue (NATO 2015). This indicates that Sweden is both outside 
and inside NATO. Sweden’s relation to the Alliance cooperation is one of the most 
important controversies in modern Swedish politics. A strong Swedish domestic political 
and public consensus in favor of nonalignment consolidated from the postwar era and the 
early Cold War onwards, and the consensus on nonalignment in itself became the most 
fundamental argument. By then, a significant feature of all neutral states was that the 
political and public attitudes reflected a view of NATO as embodying a number of “public 
bads” such as the great powers’ pursuit of power politics, nuclear weapons, and militarism 
(Cottey 2013: 452). 
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6.1 The path to the ambiguous partnership 
Toward the end and directly after the World War II, there was a hope among countries that 
the three victory powers, the US, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, would be capable of 
solving the world conflicts during the year of the establishment of the United Nations (UN). 
It was soon clear that it would not be possible to avoid mutual suspicion and bloc 
formations. NATO was established in 1949 as a consequence of the worsening of the 
relationship between the US and the Soviet Union after the peace circuit of 1945 (Kronvall 
and Petersson 2012: 19, Hovi and Underdal 2010: 62). This indicated an end to the 
expectations after the World War II and the Cold War was by then a fact.  
Before the Cold War was a fact, Swedish politics of “building bridges” aimed to contribute 
to the status quo and bridge the superpower tensions (Kronvall and Petersson 2012: 19). 
These politics included elements of confidence-building in relation to the Soviet Union, 
although there were also elements of deterrence. The Swedish government took a stance 
with clear features of isolation toward the Western powers. It was considered important to 
not participate in a Western bloc formation, partly because it could be interpreted as directed 
against the Soviet Union and partly because Sweden’s national political leeway of action 
could decline. External pressure did also change Swedish security policy. The vision of 
“building bridges” was weakened as the superpower tensions gradually sharpened. The 
Soviet Union appeared as a more credible aggressor. Sweden’s approach toward the 
emerging Western security structures became more important and more sensitive, given the 
tense relations between the East and the West (Kronvall and Petersson 2012: 19-20).  
Already during the negotiations of the North Atlantic Treaty, Sweden was clear with its 
neutrality policy and did not participate. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Östen Undén and 
Sweden’s policies of neutrality made it clear that NATO was not an alternative for Sweden 
(Wieslander 2016). Sweden tried to counteract the Norwegian, and partly the Danish, 
orientation toward the Western powers between 1948 and 1949. There was an initiative of 
establishing an important Scandinavian defense association, which could be seen as an 
attempt to achieve a common footing for a bloc-independent security policy in a context of 
gradually more apparent tensions between the Western Bloc and the Soviet Union. The 
attempt stranded on differences in problem identifications and needs, first and foremost 
between Sweden and Norway. Neutrality was still an unchangeable condition for Sweden. 
The experience from the neutrality policies was for Norway less compelling and the wish for 
some form of guarantee from the UK and the US was strong. Neither Norway nor Denmark 
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were capable of defending their territory and even less capable of offering Sweden efficient 
military support. The establishment of NATO clearly defined the alternatives and left the 
Scandinavian states over a more definite decision. Denmark and Norway joined NATO in 
1949 and Sweden took a nonaligned position. Swedish security policy went from politics of 
“building bridges” and confidence in collective security to nonalignment and neutrality 
policy (Hovi and Underdal 2010: 104, Kronvall and Petersson 2012: 20-21).  
Olof Palme took office as Sweden’s Prime Minister in 1969. He focused on neutrality and 
the role it would have within Sweden’s security policy. This did not point out something 
new but it rather consolidated the foreign policy guidelines that were to be conducted under 
different governments with shifting politics and political leadership up until the end of the 
Cold War. The doctrine of security policy was based on the generally accepted ambition that 
Sweden in the event of an outbreak of war, namely a conflict between the West and the East, 
would be neutral. In peacetime, nonalignment became the fundamental requirement for 
politics with the intention of neutrality in wartime. The nonalignment implied first of all a 
policy of not participating in military alliances (SOU 2002: 388-389).  
There was an informal cooperation during the Cold War between Sweden and NATO and 
the US. This was in a sense unknown to the Swedish population. Arguably, there was a gap 
between the foreign affairs policies built on small state solidarity and neutrality policy and 
the real Security and Defense policies built on hidden military cooperation (Dahl 1999: 59). 
While Alliance members might have criticized the neutrals for being free-riders, it was 
nevertheless in NATO’s interest to boost their political, economic, and military 
independence in the Cold War context. Additionally, the Alliance had an interest in 
extending an implicit security commitment to the neutral states in order to deter Soviet 
aggression or pressure against them (Cottey 2013: 453). Even though the European neutrals 
were not members of the Alliance, they were part of the West.  
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 ended the Cold War and new peace was to be 
established. The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs experienced a rather fast development, 
which included participation in the EU Security and Defense policy, closer cooperation with 
NATO, issuing far-reaching solidarity clauses in case of a potential attack, and putting 
peacekeeping missions and their interaction with development aid at the forefront of 
Swedish security policy. This indicates that the change of Swedish security policy was not 
only a change of direction but a new path was also defined. The changes involved a new 
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interpretation of the concept of neutrality and nonalignment, and foremost the relation to the 
EU as a political alliance and NATO as a military alliance. The changes have considered the 
threat and security risks for Sweden, and in connection with the usage of military resources 
and the perception of peace promotion. These changes have required, in a country with a 
tradition of neutrality and active peacekeeping politics, deep political discussions and 
principled stances, both within and between the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag), government 
offices, and the Defense Committee (Bjurner 2010: 37).  
The fall of the Berlin Wall did not only lead to a shift in geopolitics and potential threats, but 
also new intergovernmental institutions and a change in already existing institutions. The 
enlargement of the EU was to successively involve more members, including Sweden, and 
the development of the foreign policies toward the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) did change both the conditions for and the management of Swedish security politics. 
This movement strengthened from 1999 with an European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP) and did in turn convert the EU into an operational security policy actor. It was 
renamed to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) with the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, and it was given more instruments for military and civil capacities. 
New institutions have further on strengthened the EU with the creation of the High 
Representative of Common Foreign and Security Policy (HR), who represents both the 
European Council and the European Commission, and with the establishment of the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) (Bjurner 2010: 40).   
The policy adaptation to the NATO partnership has primarily occurred at the policymaking 
elite level whereas resistance to change remains a more powerful factor at the general public 
level. The fact that the Social Democratic and center-right governments have adapted 
Swedish defense to NATO with minimal public debate partly explains why the partnership 
is ambiguous (Cottey 2013: 447).  
6.2 Political parties and public opinion  
Historically, the nonalignment policy has been hard to question in Swedish politics 
(Wästberg 1998: 15-16). The defining feature of the European neutral states’ relationship 
with NATO was their non-membership of the Alliance. The political distance between the 
neutrals and NATO was reinforced by the nature of the public debates on foreign and 
security policy in these countries (Cottey 2013: 452).  
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The statement by the Supreme Commander, Sverker Göransson, in January 2013 that 
Sweden would only have military capacity to defend limited targets of the Swedish territory 
during “a week on its own” became the starting point of a long and turbulent defense debate, 
and it is still going on (Bjereld 2014: 487). The defense issue has consequently taken more 
space in the Swedish domestic politics over the years. With regard to the December 
Agreement of 2014, the defense policy was pointed as a priority for achieving bloc 
settlements. Such negotiations were initiated in spring 2015 between the Social Democratic-
Green government and the center-right Alliance.1 They presented the document 
“Försvarspolitisk inriktning 2016-2020” in April 2015, where the Social Democrats, the 
Green Party, the Moderate Party, the Center Party, and the Christian Democrats expressed a 
consensus on the design of the defense politics and the resource allocation the upcoming 
years. The Liberals stepped aside of this settlement since they think that the armed forces 
should possess more resources than agreed upon (Bjereld and Ydén 2015: 289).  
With regard to the membership issue, the frontlines between the Swedish political parties 
have been relatively stable. The Liberals has been the only political party clearly stating pro-
membership. What has changed on the issue is that the Moderate Party, the Center Party, 
and the Christian Democrats are currently explicitly in favor of NATO membership (Dahl 
2016). Thus, a NATO membership gains ground among the center-right parties while the 
Social Democratic-Green government and the Left Party remain opposed to a Swedish 
membership (Bjereld and Ydén 2015: 292). Additionally, the Sweden Democrats are clear 
opponents of NATO.  
The defense issue receives more attention in the media and the debate has affected the public 
opinion. The percentage of the Swedish population who wants to lower the defense costs has 
decreased and more people are worried over the Russian aggression (Bjereld and Ydén 
2015: 290-291). On the one hand, the yes-side wants Sweden to join NATO for security 
reasons. On the other hand, apart from the possible requirements on increasing the defense 
expenditure as a consequence of joining NATO, the opposition of a Swedish membership is 
also embedded in the “nuclear weapon option” and in the US dominance within NATO 
(Bjurner 2010: 43-44).  
Graph 2: The Swedes’ attitude toward NATO membership 1994-2014 (percent) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Constituted by the Moderate Party, the Liberals, the Center Party, and the Christian Democrats.  
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Source: SOM 2014. (Bjereld 2014).	   
The public opinion is currently changing and there is an increasing polarization on the topic. 
According to the 2014 SOM-survey, NATO resistance remains at a lower level than before. 
However, there is still a larger support for nonalignment than for a Swedish NATO 
membership (Bjereld and Ydén 2015: 292).  
6.3 Sweden’s relationship with NATO 
A NATO membership implies that member states collectively safeguard their territorial 
integrity and sovereignty. The Alliance obligation is triggered in a situation where one or 
more member states are subjected to a military attack. The core of the Alliance Treaty is 
Article 5, which regards collective self-defense. Article 5 asserts that if one of the member 
states of NATO would be subjected to an attack, then all member states “will assist the Party 
or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, 
such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain 
the security of the North Atlantic area” (NATO 1949). 
The government and the Riksdag have since the early 1990s gradually transformed the 
security policy line in a more integrationist course, in which security is sought after in 
collaboration with other states instead of alone. The Swedish solution of its challenges in 
terms of security policy can be explained as a balancing act between three key alternatives. 
The first alternative is the traditional Undén-Palme line with neutrality policy that combined 
small state realism in the core of security policy with moralistic and idealistic politics in 
global issues where the UN had a special status. The second alternative is the European 
integration within the framework of the EU, including its dimension of security and defense. 
The third alternative is the integration within the transatlantic framework of NATO, via the 
PfP (Dalsjö 2010: 61). This solution of a balancing act started in the early 1990s and here is 
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It is now two decades ago since NATO initiated the first partnership arrangements with non-
members and the European neutrals. There are variations in how these countries engage with 
the Alliance. Sweden and Finland have adopted maximalist policies of everything but 
membership, while Austria, Ireland, and Switzerland have been more cautious in engaging 
NATO (Cottey 2013: 446-447). The Bildt Cabinet initiated the partnership with NATO in 
1994 through the PfP. Sweden appeared as an enthusiastic participant especially during this 
period, but also during Carlsson’s Third Cabinet and the Persson Cabinet (Dahl 1999: 92).  
The NATO membership was not an issue during the 1990s, regardless of center-right 
government or Social Democratic government. There was no heritage of wanting such 
membership and there was therefore no political willingness to touch upon the membership 
issue. Sweden was not interested in a membership but to contribute to a pan-European 
security order, and the leadership saw a necessity to be more efficient in international 
operations led by NATO (Wieslander 2016). The concept of neutrality loosened up 
gradually but a new formulation came first in 2002 in the Foreign Policy Declaration that 
“Sweden is military nonaligned”. The only expressed limitation that Sweden has imposed 
itself is to not be included in any binding defense obligations (Bjereld and Ydén 2015: 289).  
NATO is intergovernmental in the sense that each member country has a veto. However, 
there is arguably, in practice, a division of influence within the organization (Hovi and 
Underdal 2010: 62, 67). NATO has three features that have a significant implication on its 
relationship with the European neutrals and make that relationship complex. The fist feature 
is the multiple nature of NATO’s identity and role, being both a defense alliance, an 
institutional expression of the West, and a collective security organization by taking on the 
mission of international peacekeeping. The second feature is the selective and differential 
way in which both members and partners participate in alliance activities, policies, and 
institutions. For instance, the decisions on defense policy remain under the national control 
of member states so the degree to which the countries contribute to NATO’s military 
capacity varies significantly. Moreover, the concept of burden-sharing has created tensions 
within the Alliance. And the last feature is the dynamic nature of the Alliance. The 
organization has changed significantly over the years with the enlargement of new members, 
the establishment of partnerships, and the engagement in international peacekeeping 
operations (Cottey 2013: 450-452).  
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The cooperation with NATO and the participation in the NATO project PfP has given 
Sweden access to a new network and a channel to military resources for international peace 
promotion. However, Sweden cannot participate in NATO’s planning for Article 5 missions 
since Sweden is not subject to Article 5 as a non-member. This limitation within the 
cooperation has implications for the opportunity to be informed of the planning and the 
execution of the peacekeeping missions under NATO leadership where Sweden participates. 
This lack of information has been a challenge of both practical and principled importance for 
Sweden, often together with Finland. This challenge has to some extent diminished over 
time. Sweden has, together with other EU countries that are not members of NATO, 
watched over so that they are not discriminated as EU members in the cooperation between 
the EU and NATO. This regards, first of all, the access to information and the consultations 
on participation and planning of a mission (Bjurner 2010: 46). This is an indication of the 
existence of different MLG layers, since Sweden can influence its non-member position 
through its EU membership.  
Sweden fulfills NATO’s aim of cooperation within 60 different fields, and in some cases 
even better than NATO members (Holmström 2011: 577, 580). Sweden has in 20 years 
adapted its defense to NATO standards. In the NATO language, there are two types of 
interoperability – military interoperability and political interoperability. This implies that the 
countries should be able to cooperate and adapt to NATO standards both militarily and 
politically. What Sweden has is a very high military interoperability but a lower political 
interoperability. For instance, Sweden can participate in the planning of international 
operations through a decision-shaping mechanism, although not when the decisions are 
made, but not in a case of territorial defense since that involves Article 5 (Wieslander 2016).  
The NATO Partnership has enabled Sweden to cooperate with the Alliance on matters that 
the leadership has considered important for Sweden. While the NATO membership has been 
a disputed and difficult issue, the current agreements seem to characterize more unity than 
the membership issue itself, although being an ambiguous relationship. However, territorial 
defense is more important for NATO at the moment, which changes Sweden’s relation to the 
organization and its non-membership since Article 5 regards territorial defense. There is a 
shift of focus, with less international operations and more territorial defense. Sweden’s 
bilateral agreements are therefore even more important when NATO is closing itself inwards 
to prior territorial defense (Britz 2016).  
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The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Host Nation Support was signed between 
Sweden and NATO at the 2014 Wales Summit and submitted for decisions to the Riksdag 
on May 25 2016. The entry into force of the agreement will enable Sweden to give and 
receive support, in terms of civil and military assistance, from NATO in Sweden or in the 
neighborhood in peacetime, conflict, or war. In addition, it means that Sweden can be a host 
for mutually planned military activities (NATO 2016). The Minister of Defense Peter 
Hultqvist has stressed that allied forces can only be located on Swedish territory with a 
Swedish invitation. The disputed issue of nuclear weapons is not stated in the proposal and 
Hultqvist declared that there will be no changes in the agreement but that nuclear weapons 
will under no circumstances be permitted (TT 2016).  
As an additional extension of the bilateral agreements, the Social Democratic-Green 
government took an initiative in summer 2015 to deepen and increase the defense 
cooperation with the US. This move was based on the assumption among Social Democrats 
that NATO will be slow to act in case of a crisis in the Baltic Sea region and that bilateral 
arrangements with the US are the most crucial for Sweden’s security (Wieslander 2016: 4). 
Additionally, The Swedish and Danish Ministers of Defense did on January 14 2016 sign an 
agreement for enhanced defense cooperation. This bilateral agreement implies that Sweden 
and Denmark will use each other’s military infrastructure, with airbases and harbors, and 
they will exchange information of what is happening in the region of Öresund 
(Regeringskansliet 2016, Holmström 2016). 
6.4 Plan B 
The current Social Democratic-Green government maintains its traditional stand of keeping 
Sweden nonaligned. The official stand has been that a membership of NATO would 
jeopardize Sweden’s possibilities to act constructively in the Baltic Sea region and it would 
reduce the credibility for Sweden as a conflict solver and mediator (Święcicki 1998: 100).  
The tactics of adaptation implemented by Sweden is to be a good partner, and Sweden is 
keeping up a good job considering its non-membership position (Britz 2016, Wieslander 
2016). What Sweden did between 1994 and 2014 was to gradually place its practical 
cooperation as close to NATO as possible without overstepping the Article 5 line 
(Wieslander 2016). Sweden’s relationship with NATO is nowadays a new kind of 
cooperation since NATO’s focus has moved much closer geographically. NATO’s challenge 
is extensive in the Baltic Sea region and Russia has local military superiority of 
	   38	  
conventional forces and has illustrated, through exercises and the war in Ukraine, its 
capacity to quickly mobilize troops. Sweden’s relationship with NATO has thus moved 
much closer to the Article 5 (Wieslander 2016: 13, Wieslander 2016).  
The government advocates the NATO Partnership and the aim of strengthening the Nordic 
defense cooperation (Bjereld and Ydén 2015: 292). The Minister of Defense Hultqvist has 
expressed that it is not on the political agenda to apply for a Swedish membership. The 
government will continue the bilateral cooperation with NATO and the Nordic countries, 
and aims for an extended national defense capability. Additionally, Sweden’s security policy 
should be based on a long-term stability and the government will maintain this stability 
without changing the doctrine (Sveriges Radio 2015).  
As mentioned above, the theoretical definition of plan A is that a country applies for 
membership in the international organizations. I thus argue that the political elite never 
carried through plan A because a Swedish membership was by no means on the agenda, 
despite the fall of the Berlin Wall (Wieslander 2016). Thus, there was no political voice for a 
membership strategy at the establishment of NATO, or when the Berlin Wall fell, and 
neither in the 1990s. Plan B was directly brought about with the NATO Partnership and 
other bilateral agreements. This approach was intensified in the 1990s and is the current 
strategy.   
7 Comparative analysis 
There are different costs and benefits with the memberships of the EU and NATO that 
should be reflected on. Moreover, the political leadership has to take the public opinion into 
consideration. The Norwegian and Swedish elites are still considering how far they can go 
without a formal membership and without giving up too much of their sovereignty, and also 
the degree to which sovereignty can be strengthened by joining international organizations.  
What is common in both cases is that their strategy when approaching the organizations is 
everything but membership. Thus, the strategy for Norway is the EEA agreement and the 
strategy for Sweden is the partnership agreement – agreements that are good enough when 
the possibility of formal membership is not possible. Plan B in both cases is “don’t rock the 
boat”. That is, do not upset the people by trying to change the situation. The decisions form 
the path for the countries, and the choices are bounded due to pre-existing conditions. Thus, 
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the choice of strategy clearly depends on the public opinion’s preference and the elite’s 
analysis of the international political and economic situation.  
7.1 What explains the current strategy choices? 
Norway assumed that the EEA agreement could work for five to six years and that Norway 
could become member of the EU later. The Norwegian leadership originally hoped that the 
EEA agreement would be brought in from the beginning of 1993 and after some years of 
“socialization” in the single market the public would come to accept full EU membership. 
These hopes broke down when the Swedish government, followed by the Finnish 
government, submitted their applications in 1991 (Archer 2005: 57). The Norwegian elite 
lost the 1994 referendum while Sweden joined the EU and Norway was trapped in a difficult 
situation. Brundtland had declared that she would not resign if they lost and held a meeting 
the day after the referendum in the Council of State declaring that Norway would govern 
with the new agreements from that point on. From day one, she traveled from one European 
country to another in order to guarantee that there was no doubt about the EEA. This was the 
big decision, so if it was a strategy it happened the first day after the 1994 referendum of 
November 29 (Sverdrup 2016).  
Sweden has always been nonaligned and did not have the possibility of joining NATO. The 
neutrality policy has been weakened after 1989 and the opportunity of membership was 
possible. Sweden could have joined NATO up until around 2008 but there is a probability 
that a Swedish membership would have some costs and Russia’s reaction on a membership 
would arguably have some effects. The choice of not joining may have had something to do 
with Sweden’s path dependency and domestic politics, but today it may have something to 
do with Sweden’s domestic politics and relation to Russia. There was a winning-opportunity 
but Sweden did not take it, and therefore the country is where it is today (Sverdrup 2016).  
Sovereignty and neutrality are embedded in the countries’ domestic politics and national 
identity and can be interpreted as path-dependent institutions. The path may be altered, but it 
requires a good deal of political pressure to produce that change (Peters 2005: 71). Larger 
external chocks are required for the political leeway of action to change. In the case of 
Sweden, the Social Democrats are much more bound since their underlying idea was the 
welfare state and the neutrality policy. If there should be a change, then they would need to 
change identity, and identity politics mean a lot for the political leeway of action (Britz 
2016). In the case of Norway, the yes-side could change path in some years but that depends 
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on the development of the EU and the political climate on the domestic arena, and not least 
economic and political challenges that Norway has to take into consideration. If there should 
be a fundamental change in the public opinion, individual groups such as women and 
younger people, need to change opinion. This also requires changes in the regional 
cleavages. Moreover, the political parties are split on the issue. This, and disagreement 
within the government constellations, is possibly an explanation of the absence of an active 
EU debate in Norway over the last years (Narud, Hveem, and Høyland 2010: 354). The plan 
B strategy, in both cases, is a result of path-dependency.  
One could argue that the Norwegian yes-side lost because the no-side prevailed in the debate 
all the time and because the yes-parties were split in their view of the EU and in turn 
incapable to lead an efficient campaign. There is a parallel between Norway and Sweden 
with regard to the success of the no-side. They have, in both cases, not missed the 
opportunity to express their message and their stance against a membership. The Norwegian 
Labour Party and the Conservative Party were discrete yes-parties until late in the 1994 
campaign and the Swedish center-right parties have been discrete and arguably late in their 
stance of being in favor or against a NATO membership. It is very recent that the Alliance is 
unanimous on this issue. Thus, I would argue that the Norwegian and Swedish yes-side did 
not take their winning-opportunity when they had it and they failed to mobilize the 
population by not being clear, in contrast to the no-side.  
Moreover, Norway had joined NATO because history had illustrated the demand for a 
strong defense. A Norwegian NATO membership did arguably lead to sovereignty since the 
country was not capable of defending itself alone after World War II. A Norwegian EU 
membership would on the other hand be a threat to sovereignty since the country has been 
protective due to its self-interest of defending its special economic track. Similarly, it is 
possible that a Swedish EU membership did lead to sovereignty because Sweden 
experienced a difficult economic crisis in which the manufacturing sector saw the single 
market as the solution. A Swedish NATO membership would on the other hand be a threat 
to sovereignty since Sweden has a history military non-alignment and the experience of a 
self-sufficient defense. 
The political leadership has negotiated a plan B in order to achieve important collective 
goals through international cooperation. MLG and collective action among states are closely 
connected. Sovereign states are required to cede parts of their autonomy to transnational 
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institutions and systems in order to make collective solutions work. There is a complex 
relationship between two entities, Norway and the EU and Sweden and NATO, but what 
happens within them is a matter of consideration as well. The decision-making process and 
institutions involve many political actors and different levels of governance. Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs), representatives of interest groups, and regional voices join the 
government ministers, civil servants, and technocrats (Archer 2005: 5). Sovereign state 
governments, regional and local administrations, and EU institutions have become 
interlocked in MLG whereby national governmental control is weakened by the activities of 
supranational and subnational actors (Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996: 373).  
MLG is an important tool for understanding the implementation of European directives in 
Norway (Peters and Pierre 2009: 91, 95). As the EU has developed, the EU treaties cover 
some of the core areas of the state activity, which affects non-members when they come to 
negotiate such matters. The EU structure implies that the relationship is not just 
intergovernmental. There are means for Norwegian involvement in the layers of MLG, and 
the EU will most likely interact with the various sections of Norwegian society as well 
(Archer 2005: 5). Regulations from Brussels and Luxemburg control the activity also in 
Norway, and Norway is committed to implement the EU directives and regulations both on 
national, regional, and local level. First of all because Norway forms part of the EEA and is 
therefore tied to the EU legislation. Secondly, the EU has little implementation capacity of 
its own and depends on the member states and their components in order to be able to put 
policy choices into effect (Peters and Pierre 2009: 96). Similarly, there are means for 
Swedish involvement in NATO and its layers of MLG, and NATO is likely to interact with 
the Swedish security and defense sections as well. Sweden is involved in these layers 
through the NATO Partnership, and additionally through the EU-NATO cooperation that 
Sweden is automatically tied to by being an EU member. For instance, Sweden has achieved 
a high military interoperability by internationalizing its defense capacity according to NATO 
standards. This internationalization is a requirement for Sweden to cooperate as a NATO 
partner, such as during the international operations, and it also enables NATO to interact 
with the Swedish defense section. Thus, both countries are involved in the layers of MLG to 
a higher extent by having adapted their systems to the respective organization. This 
automatically leads them to participation in the institutions of the EU and NATO, but not to 
the decision-making process since that is the line between a partner and a member.  
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7.2 What are the implications of the strategy choices? 
The disadvantage of non-membership in the Norwegian and the Swedish cases is that the 
countries are bound by great parts of the regulation but without any vote on it, and by not 
participating in the decision-making they lack influence and information intake (Sverdrup 
2016, Wieslander 2016). This makes the cooperation to a technical association on a low 
level conducted by experts. While the countries cooperate practically with the organizations, 
there is a great lack of political influence since the political leadership is not participating in 
the decision-making process. Sweden has a low political interoperability while the military 
interoperability is very high (Sverdrup 2016, Wieslander 2016, Britz 2016). Due to the 
asymmetric relationship between Norway and the EU in economic terms, partly because 
Norway’s income from oil and gas is designated in dollars, a main advantage of non-
membership is the benefit of having its own currency. During the negotiations for a possible 
EU membership in the early 1990s, the deal was different than for Sweden and if Norway 
joined the EU in 1995 it would have been tied up to the EMU automatically. The EEA had 
clear benefits for Norway as it opened up the EC market for its exports. Moreover, the 
advantage of non-membership depends on the sector and the agriculture sector is possibly 
the one benefitting the most from the EEA agreement since it would loose more with an EU 
membership (Sverdrup 2016, Archer 2005: 57). In the Swedish case, the political leeway of 
action is the principal advantage of non-membership (Wieslander 2016, Britz 2016). 
There is a need for separating formal and real sovereignty and formal and real neutrality. 
One can say that the formal sovereignty in Norway is high while the real sovereignty is low, 
and the real sovereignty is much lower than the population perceives it to be. Similarly, one 
can say that the formal neutrality in Sweden is high while the real neutrality is low 
(Sverdrup 2016). There is cooperation on different levels where actors intervene. The MLG 
can thus explain why the difference of formal and real sovereignty and neutrality. The 
cooperation between Norway and the EU is each time broader, since the EEA agreement is 
dynamic and uniform, and the cooperation between Sweden and NATO is intensified, 
arguably due to Russian periodic aggression. There was a close cooperation with NATO and 
the US during the Cold War when both the formal and real neutrality was perceived high. 
Sweden was more integrated with NATO and the US than the people was aware of 
(Sverdrup 2016). Since there is an aim of maintaining sovereignty, it is important to point 
out that there is a gap in the understanding of how much sovereignty there actually is. 
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One may wonder what the Norwegian and the Swedish leaderships do in order to build 
knowledge and understanding in society to increase its own leeway for the possibility of 
moving toward more or less integration with the organizations. The situation for Norway is 
that the Norwegian government is doing little and the Norwegian society has a generally 
declining knowledge, which means that the population knows less about the real association 
with the EU. So the formal association is advocated in the public debate. Since the NATO 
issue is a very politicized and brings up a rather emotional debate, it is difficult to promote 
factual insight. There is a gap of understanding in both countries (Sverdrup 2016), and the 
perception is that the country is less affected by the organization than it actually is. The EU 
issue in Norway is not solely a matter of foreign affairs but an issue that regards many of the 
areas within the domestic affairs (Narud, Hveem, and Høyland 2010: 351). The EU issue in 
Norwegian media is a matter of foreign affairs, not domestic affairs, and EU is framed as 
“the others” (Sverdrup 2016). In Sweden, the NATO issue is a matter of domestic affairs, 
although being a foreign affairs issue. Moreover, the NATO issue is particular since the 
security policy is one of the larger foreign policy matters but driven primarily by the 
Minister of Defense and not by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Wieslander 2016).  
Despite the limitations of the non-membership, one advantage can arguably be that both 
countries have their Nordic neighbors. The Nordic mutual culture, values, societal structure, 
geographic closeness, and good experience of cooperation in various policy areas can enable 
them to cooperate also on the non-membership issue (Doeser, Petersson, and Westberg: 47). 
Norway could use Sweden’s voice at the decision tables in the EU institutions and Sweden 
could use Norway’s voice at the NATO meetings. Additionally, there is possibly not a 
disadvantage that the social democrat Jens Stoltenberg is the Secretary General of NATO. 
However, it can be argued to what extent the Minister of Foreign Affairs Margot Wallström 
has taken advantage of this since she is a politician known for pushing for UN cooperation 
before NATO cooperation.   
Despite the close political cooperation with the respective organization, both Norway and 
Sweden are at the end of the day formally outside and there are no guarantees for influence 
or support. For instance, NATO stressed after the annexation of Crimea that Sweden is a 
prominent NATO partner but Article 5 does not apply. Thus, there are no grey zones 
(Sverdrup 2016, Wieslander 2016).  
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Regardless of how far the cooperation advances in terms of EU adjustment, Norway can 
always resign the EEA agreement. That is the difference between the agreement and the EU 
membership. The EU membership is irreversible and so is the NATO membership. Sweden 
can always resign the Partnership agreement, regardless of the high military interoperability. 
However, there is a possibility that the Partnership undermines the status as a nonaligned 
state, which in turn could decrease the security for Sweden. But one could also question 
what signals as an economic partner Norway would send with a resignation of the EEA 
agreement. However, membership is not on the agenda and neither is a resignation of the 
agreements. The trajectory for both countries has thus been to approach the organization as 
close as possible without formally joining.  
Opening up negotiations for membership would imply high costs since there is a resistance 
both in the public opinion and in the political parties. It is unlikely to believe that Norway is 
employing an informal pattern of political coordination as a strategy to bypass the question 
of membership. Although there are different points of view on the EU membership among 
the political parties, the matter of membership is not on the political agenda. The political 
leadership, the government, will be dissolved if a debate of EU membership is initiated 
again (NOU 2012: 271). A referendum will only take place again if the Storting decides to 
submit a new application for membership. Since Sweden is an EU member and since the 
ESDP made the EU a security policy actor, one may argue that it is not necessary to join 
NATO formally. Moreover, the Partnership and bilateral cooperation seems to upset people 
less. It is hard to think that Sweden would apply for a NATO membership bypassing a 
referendum, since it is a very politicized issue. The public opinion has changed and it 
remains to see whether it keeps changing or not. However, it is maybe not impossible that 
the center-right Alliance make it an election question for the next national election 
campaign. But that remains to be seen since they are currently opposition parties and have 
earlier, when being government parties, not stressed the issue as a priority. Moreover, there 
are other issues that are challenges for the parties in their campaign for votes.   
It appears to be less willingness to consider a change from the Partnership link with the EU 
and NATO if a majority of politicians, public, interest groups see it as functioning 
cooperation. In the case of Norway, the EEA arguably gives the country freedom to operate 
its own policies according to its interests (Archer 2005: 177). There has so far been less 
willingness to change Norway’s choice of cooperation and the EEA is generally seen as a 
successful agreement. Similarly, as long as the Swedish elite sees the NATO cooperation as 
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successful and the public opinion does not keep changing, then there will be less willingness 
to change the partnership relationship.  
The Norwegian and Swedish political leaderships have, through suboptimization, negotiated 
a plan B, in the form of agreements, in order to achieve important collective goals. As long 
as the countries vote for a less compromising choice than membership, there will obviously 
not be a move toward more integration. A move toward more or less integration will depend 
on the mass-elite evaluation of how to maintain their sovereignty.  
The findings of this thesis lead to some key questions for the future political leadership to 
answer.  
• How can Norway and Sweden best confront their upcoming challenges with regard 
to their non-membership of the EU and the non-membership of NATO?   
• How can they fill the gap of formal and real sovereignty? 
• How can they balance the needs on the domestic arena and their role on the 
international arena?  
8 Conclusion  
The aim of the Master’s Thesis has been to contribute to our understanding of how state 
sovereignty can be pursued either individually or collectively. Empirically, I have compared 
the Norwegian non-membership of the EU and the Swedish non-membership of NATO and 
their strategies in order to approach these organizations and what implications these have for 
the countries. 
The theoretical definition is that plan A for a country is to apply for membership in the 
international organizations. Norway’s plan A was to join the EU but since the Norwegian 
elite lost the 1994 referendum, the EEA agreement became plan B. I furthermore argue that 
Sweden never had a plan A of joining NATO and brought about plan B directly, which was 
the NATO Partnership. In both cases, plan B has been the strategy ever since.  
Both Norway and Sweden are historically resistant countries toward supranational 
international organizations. The countries cannot join the respective organization since 
public opinion does not give legitimacy to a membership strategy. There is both a need to 
maintain sovereignty and for political cooperation, which explains why the leaderships have 
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had to find alternative strategies. Plan B is an example of a strategy which I have referred to 
as suboptimization.  
It is challenging for Norway and Sweden to be utility-maximizing actors in a context where 
the decision alternatives are shaped by the demand for long-term objectives, and that is why 
Simon’s bounded rationality applies to this study. The Norwegian and Swedish leaderships 
have been aware of what the special relationship with the respective organization means for 
the countries. Despite the consequences of less influence and guarantee for support, they 
obviously see benefits with it and apply a satisficing strategy. When comparing the 
Norwegian non-membership of the EU and the Swedish non-membership of NATO, it can 
be concluded that sovereignty is maintained by collective action through the plan B strategy.  
In order for collective solutions to work, they have been required to cede parts of their 
autonomy to transnational institutions and systems. In both cases, there is a decision-making 
process on many levels where actors achieve their objectives partly through negotiation. 
They suboptimize through MLG in order to achieve their goals.  
As an extension to this study, future research should focus on the development of these 
special relationships and the gap of understanding between formal and real sovereignty. 
Moreover, research should draw attention to what effect the Norwegian and Swedish non-
membership strategy has on the opportunity to establish a more intense Nordic cooperation 
for a safer and richer region.  
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